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Introduction 
Policies of forbearance to stockholders of insol- 
vent firms by federal deposit guarantors represent 
a wealth transfer from federal deposit-insurance 
agencies, and ultimately from federal taxpayers, 
to the stockholders of the insured institutions. 
Kane (1985, 1986), Pyle (19861, and Thomson 
(1987) discuss theoretical determinants of the 
value of forbearances to stockholders of financial 
institutions by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and 
Loan  Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). Brickley and 
James (1986) show empirically that the stock- 
market returns of thrifts increase with the exten- 
sion of FSLIC capital forbearances. 
This paper investigates the rela- 
tionship between the market and book values of 
the firm's equity. It demonstrates that the market 
value of a thrift is positively related to its book 
value and to the value of its unbooked assets. We 
argue that one of the major unbooked assets of a 
thrift is its  FSLlC insurance guarantee. Measures of 
FSLIC forbearance policy are shown to be related 
to the market value of the thrifts whose market 
values exceed their book values. 
Section I of this paper discusses 
the relationship between the market value and 
book value of a firm. It outlines the reasons that 
these values may diverge and argues that FSUC 
guarantees are one of the unbooked assets valued 
by the market. Section 11  gives a brief overview of 
the empirical evidence and theoretical arguments 
regarding the value of federal deposit guarantees 
and forbearances. Section 111 describes the data, 
the sample selection criteria, the regression 
experiment used to test the forbearance hypothe- 
sis, and the empirical results. The conclusions 
and policy implications of the paper are pre- 
sented in section N. 
I.  The Relationship Between Market 
and Book Values 
The book value of a firm's equity is measured as 
the difference between the book value of the 
firm's assets-in-place and the par value of its lia- 
bilities. The book value of assets may not equal 
their market value for three reasons. First, the 
accounting conventions used by most firms cany 
assets at their par, or acquisition, value and do 
not reflect subsequent changes in the market value 
of the assets. The market value of the assets would 
include these unbooked gains and losses. Sec- 
ond, because book values tend to include only 
assets-in-place, they do not measure the value of 
options for future business that are unique to the 
firm.'  Finally, to avoid taxes, burdensome regula- 
tions, or restrictive debt covenants, some firms 
may engage in activities that are not carried on 
their books. The assets (liabilities) associated 
with these activities would not show up in  book 
measures of assets (liabilities), but would none- 
theless be reflected in their market values. 
Myers (1977) and Warner (1977)  argue that the market value of  1  the lifm's assets includes both the market value of  the assets-in- 
place and the market value of  the flrms options for prof~table  future 
buslness opportunities  Therefore, ~f the firm canied ~ts  assets in-place at 
market value, the book value of  the firm would understate ~ts  markel 
value 
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On the other side of the ledger, the 
firm carries its liabilities at par. Like the assets, the 
liabilities' market value includes unbooked 
changes. The market value of the firm's liabilities 
also includes off-balance-sheet financing and other 
types of contingent liabilities not reflected in 
book values (see Bennett [I9861 and Forde 
[I9871  ).  Therefore, the book value of the firm's 
equity will differ from its market value if the errors 
in the book measures of the firm's assets and lia- 
bilities do not completely offset one another. 
Unbooked Losses and Gains in Thrift Portfolios 
The market value of a thrift institution's assets can 
be separated into the market value of its assets-in- 
place and the market value of its charter. The mar- 
ket value of the assets-in-place may not equal their 
book value because the accounting procedures 
that thrifts and their regulators use to calculate 
book values do not take into account unrealized 
gains and losses on the thrift's asset portfolio. 
For example, thrifts hold a large vol- 
ume of fixed-rate mortgages, whose market values 
fluctuate inversely with interest rates. When inter- 
est rates rise, the market values of the mortgages 
decrease while the face value of the mortgage 
portfolio remains constant. Because thrifts are not 
forced to recognize capital losses on the mort- 
gages until they are sold (or until the customer 
defaults), an increase in interest rates causes the 
book value of the mortgage portfolio to exceed 
its market value and the market value of the 
assets-in-place to be less than their book value. 
Another source of unbooked capi- 
tal gains and losses in the thrift's portfolio are real 
estate holdings. Thrifts tend to carry real estate on 
their books at acquisition price, which may not 
equal the current value of the real estate. The real 
estate portfolios of many thrifts are likely to be 
carried on their books at a discount from market 
value, which may cause the book value of the 
thrifts to be less than their market value. 
The Value of Thrift Charters 
The charter value of a thrift reflects the value of 
its unbooked assets2 We can divide the value of 
the thrift's charter into five categories. The first is 
the value of  business relationships built over 
time. Kane and Malkiel(1965) argue that long- 
standing customer banking relationships have 
......................................... 
Buser  Chen  and Kane (1981) rnalntaln that the FDIC  attempts lo  2  preserve the value of  the lnk~ng  charter when d~sps~ng  of  a 
failed bank, by uslng the charters value to reduce !he  d~sposal  costs  If  Ihe 
bank  s  disposed of  via a purchase and assurnpt~on  transaction  the pur 
chase  premlum pa~d  by the bank  acqulrlng Ihe failed bank reflects the 
value because they lower the information and 
contracting costs associated with doing business. 
The reduction in the cost of servicing long- 
standing customers is available only to the servic- 
ing thrift and is a source of  profitable future busi- 
ness opportunities. 
Firm-specific options for profitable 
future business opportunities are the second 
source of the charter's value. These options may 
be available to the thrift because it  has developed 
expertise in servicing a particular segment of the 
market. The third source is monopoly rents that 
may accrue to the thrift from restrictive branching 
laws and other regulations that restrict competition. 
The fourth source of the charter's 
value is access to Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
(FHLBB) advances.  The FHLBB makes secured 
loans to member thrifts at subsidized rates. These 
advances represent both a direct subsidy and an in- 
expensive source of backup liquidity.  The fifth com- 
ponent of the charter's value is federal deposit 
guarantees. Kane (1985, 1986) maintains that the 
mispricing of deposit insurance and the use of 
forbearance policy by federal deposit guarantors 
has made the value of deposit guarantees an 
important source of thrift charter values.  2 7 
11.  FSLIC  Subsidies, Forbearances, and the Market 
Value of Thrift Institutions 
A new and growing body of literature addresses 
the value of federal deposit insurance subsidies 
and forbearances to insured depository institu- 
tions. Kane (1985, 1986) argues that the aggre- 
gate net worth of the thrift industry, net of the 
value of deposit guarantees and forbearances, is 
negative. Fy1e  (1986) shows that the the use of 
capital forbearances increases the value of deposit 
guarantees. Brickley and James (1986) empirically 
demonstrate a positive relationship between the 
adoption of a capital forbearance policy by the 
FHLBB and the market value of thrift institutions. 
Ronn and Verma (1986) show that estimates of the 
fair value of deposit guarantees are extremely 
sensitive to assumptions regarding the forbear- 
ance policy the FDIC employs when disposing of 
failed banks. Thomson (1987) breaks down the 
value of the deposit guarantee into three compo- 
nents: the value of the guarantee on insured 
deposits, the value of a conditional guarantee on 
the uninsured deposits, and the value of a condi- 
tional guarantee of the stockholders' claim on the 
residual future earnings of the insured institution. 
This paper is concerned with the value of forbear- 
ances to the stockholders of  insured institutions. 
The federal deposit insurance agen- 
cies extend forbearances to stockholders of insol- 
vent institutions in two ways. The first, and politi- 
cally preferred, method is to allow the institutions 
1  value of the charter to the acquiring ~nst~tut~on  to operate after they are discovered to be insol 
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vent.3 The de lure failure of a federally insured 
bank or thrift is an event timed by the regulators. 
The extension of explicit or implicit guarantees 
to the claims of uninsured depositors and general 
creditors of the insolvent bank or thrift removes 
the incentives of these individuals to force the 
closing and reorganization of the in~titution.~ 
A forbearance policy that does not 
at least close out the position of sttxkholders in 
insured depository institutions that are found to 
be insolvent has value to the stockholders (see 
Thomson [I9871  ). It represents an option on the 
future residual earnings of the institution. The 
behavior of the stock of Beverly Hills Savings and 
Loan (BHSL) of California is evidence that this 
type of forbearance has value. At  the end of 
March 1985, roughly one month before it was 
closed by the FHLBB, the stock of BHSL had a 
market value of $19.21 million, while the book 
value of its equity was -$58.091 milli~n.~ 
The second way stockholders re- 
ceive forbearances from the federal deposit 
insurer is when the federal deposit guarantor 
uses open-bank assistance to handle the failure 
(or to head off the imminent failure) of an 
insured in~titution.~  In this case, the federal de- 
posit guarantor may preserve some or all of the 
value of the stockholders' claim on the residual 
future income of the institution. 
For example, when the FDIC 
bailed out the Continental Illinois Bank and Trust 
Company of Chicago (Continental) in 1984, it 
gave the original stockholders warrants allowing 
them to purchase shares in the reorganized insti- 
tution. The estimated value of these warrants was 
approximately $155 million (close to 20 percent 
of  the estimated equity value of the reorganized 
Continental) on the day after the bailout package 
was announced. 
3 
Net  worth certificates  and capital forbearances are two of the 
tools that pol~t~cians  and Industry regulators use to forestall the 
closing of  ~nsolvent  ~nst~tutlons  (see Nash (19871 and  McTague [1987]). 
4 
The depos~t  guarantor must provide the un~nsured  depos~tors  with 
a guarantee of  the market value of  their claim at the time the 
~nst~tut~on  IS discovered to be ~nsolvent  on a market-value  bas~s 
5 
The  BHSL was adm~tted  to  the FHLBB's  management cons~gn- 
ment program on Apr~l  25. 1985  At that  tlme, the book value of 
11s assets was $2939 blllion, and 11s TNW  was  -$58 091 mill~on.  On 
June 6. 1986,  the reported  TNW  of  BHSL was  -$540 mill~on.  In fact. the 
decl~ne  in BHSL's net worth under the FHLBB's management consign- 
ment program occurred when interest rates were falllng. The one-year 
secondaiy market  Treasury bill rate was 8.22 percent on  April 26, 1985, 
and 6.14 percent on June 6, 1986. Thus,  ~t  IS  fa~rly  clear  that the posl- 
tlve market value of  BHSL before 11s closing was not due to unreal~zed 
capital galns on BHSL's portfolio. 
6 
On  December 4, 1986, the FDIC announced that  11  had set up 
formal gu~dellnes  for the use of  open-bank assistance In handllng 
troubled and falied banks (see McTague [1986]) 
The probability that federal deposit 
guarantors will extend forbearances to stock- 
holders of insolvent insitutions is a function of 
constraints on the guarantors' ability to reorganize 
insolvent institutions. Kane (1986) places these 
constraints into four categories: political and legal 
constraints, information constraints, staff con- 
straints, and funding constraints reflected in the 
implicit and explicit reserves of the insurance 
fund. Sprague's (1986) account of the FDIC's 
decision to bail out Continental makes it clear 
that the first three constraints played a major role 
in that bailout. Barth, et al. (1985) show that the 
ability of the FSUC to close insolvent thrift institu- 
tions is directly related to the solvency of the 
FSUC insurance fund. 
111.  Empirical Issues 
The Data 
The sample consists of 43 thrifts that meet the fol- 
lowing criteria. First, to measure the market value 
of equity, we had to be able to obtain stock price 
and share data on the thrifts h-om Data Resources 
Incorporated's (DRI) Security Price File from 
March 1984 to the end of June 1986. Second, the 
thrifts had to be insured by the FSLIC. Third, 
balance-sheet and income-statement data had to 
be available from the FHLBB's Quarterly Reports 
of Condition and Income. Finally, to remove the 
effects of nonthrift subsidiaries h-om the results, 
we excluded all thrift holding companies. 
The requirement that the thrifts' 
stock must trade on the market restricts the sam- 
ple to the largest firms in the industry. For exam- 
ple, at the end of June 1986, the average size 
(measured in total assets) of the thrifts in our 
sample was $1.895 billion.7 This is considerably 
larger than the size of the average thrift in the 
population. Therefore, one should be careful in 
generalizing the results of the tests on this sam- 
ple to the population. We  do not expect the 
other sample selection restrictions to materially 
affect the results.8 
To construct proxy variables for 
our tests, we draw on theoretical arguments (see 
Beaver, et al.  [ 19701, Bowman  [ 19791, Myers 
[1977],  and Unal and Kane  [I9871  ); empirical 
findings (see Barth, et al. [1985],  Benston  [19861, 
.......................................... 
The largest (smallest) thr~ft  ~n  the sample at  the end of  June  7 198t measured n  terms of  total assets, was 510551 b111wn 
($164 226 mill~on) 
To  test the sens~tiv~ty  of the results  to survival b~as  we replicate  8 the cross-section regression experiments uslng a sample that 
includes all f~rms  ~n  the sample wtth complete  ~nformation  for  that quar- 
ter  Because the number of f~rms  varles across quarters, we do not 
attempt  to pool th~s  sample  Overall  the results over the larger sample 
support the paper's main results 
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Results f'rom the SMVAM Regressionsa 
(Using GAAP Net worthb) 
Quarter  Number  MKWHL~  md  ue  k  R~ 
a.  Model: MKTVAL =  Lie  +  kTNW  +  e.  t Significantly different from zero at  1%. 
b. Net worth computed using generally accepted accounting procedures.  tt Significantly different from one at  1%. 
c. Average market value of thrift stock (000's).  Significantly different from zero at  5%. 
d. Average book value of thrift equity (000's).  ** SigniBcantly different from zero at  10% 
e. T-statistics in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Author. 
TABLE  1 
Brickley and James [ 19861, and ke  and Brewer 
[ 19851 );  and the deposit-forbearance literature 
(see Kane  [ 19861, Pyle  [ 19861, Ronn and Verma 
[1986],  and Thomson  [I9871  ).  The following 
proxy variables are constructed from stock-market 
data and balance-sheet and income data. 
MKTKAL =  market value of the thrift's stock. 
IWKTVAI, is the product of the price 
of the thrift's stock and the number 
of shares outstanding, or the market 
value of equity. 
TNW =  net worth according to generally 
accepted accounting principles. TNW 
is the book value of equity. 
LIQ  =  proxy variable for liquidity. LIQ  is 
nondeposit liabilities divided by total 
book liabilities. 
DN  =  proxy variable for diversification of 
assets. DN is the sum of nonmort- 
gage loans and contracts and direct 
investments, divided by mortgage 
loans and contracts. 
TNWA =  proxy variable for solvency and a 
measure of capital adequacy. TNWA is 
TNW divided by total book assets. 
Empirical Tests of the Forbearance Hypothesis 
To test the forbearance hypothesis, we use the 
Statistical  Market-Value  Accounting  Model 
(SWAM) of Unal and Kane (1987): 
(1)  MKTI/AL=  Ue+  kTNW+ e. 
Equation 1 is the basic SWAM regression where 
MKWAL is the value of the thrift's stock and 
TNW is the book value of the thrift's equity. Unal 
and Kane interpret the slope coefficient, k, as the 
market's value of $1 of book equity, and U,  as 
the market's value of unbooked equity. In other 
words, k times TNW is the portion of market 
value accounted for by assets-in-place, and U,  is 
the portion of market value accounted for by the 
charter. 
If  booked assets and liabilities are 
marked-to-market, then the theoretical value of k 
is one; and if all assets and liabilities are carried 
on the books, the theoretical value of  Ue is zero. 
If  the charter value net of FSLIC forbearances and 
guarantees is positive (negative), FSLIC forbear- 
ances and guarantees will increase (decrease in 
absolute value terms) the size of  U,. 
Equation 1 is estimated over the 
cross-section of firms in the sample for each quar- 
ter. As seen in table 1, U,  is positive in every 
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Proportion of Stock-Market Value Explained by Charter Valuea 
Quarter  Number  ue  /MKWAL~  T-~iil~  GNMA* 
1984  1  43  0.35454  0.0952  0.1270 
2  43  0.33716  0.0987  0.1414 
3  43  0.26789  0.1037  0.1308 
4  43  0.16006  0.0806  0.1254 
1985  1  43  0.12509  0.0852  0.1268 
2  43  0.10347  0.0695  0.1154 
3  43  0.20564  0.0710  0.1 129 
4  43  0.13311  0.0710  0.1070 
1986  1  43  0.13173  0.0656  0.0944 
2  43  0.25091  0.0621  0.0957 
a.  Charter value is measured by the intercept term, U,, in the SWAM  regressions. 
b. MKTVAL is the average stock-market value of the firms in the sample. 
c.  Annual equivalent yield on 3-month Treasury bills traded on the secondary market (from Interest Rates tables in selected Federal Reserue 
Bulletins, 1984- 1986). 
d. Average net yields on Government National Mortgage Association, mortgage-backed, fully modified pass-through securities, assuming 
12-year prepayment on 30 pools of  FH4/VA mortgages (from Interest Rates tables in selected FederuIReseme Bulletins 1984-1986). 
SOURCE: Author. 
TABLE  2 
quarter. However, it is not significantly different 
from zero in five of the 10  quarters. Table 2 
shows the percent of stock-market value 
3 0  accounted for by the estimated charter value, U,. 
The value of the charter, which includes the 
FSLIC forbearances, ranges from a high of 35.4 
percent in the first quarter of 1984  to a low of 
10.3 percent in the second quarter of  1985. In 
other words, the charter is a nontrivial compo- 
nent of stockholder equity. 
The per-dollar value the market 
places on book equity, k,  appears in the sixth 
column in table 1. This value ranges from a low 
of 40 cents on the dollar in the second quarter of 
Pooling and Cross-Equation Equality Restrictions 
for the SMVAM  Regressionsa 
Test:  U,1  =  O,U,z  =  0, ......., U,IO  =O 
F(10,410) =  5.3392896t 
Test:  U,1  =  U,Z .  .  .  .  .  .  . =  U, lo 
F(9,410) = 0.62610870 
Test:  k~ =  1,k2 =  1, ......., klo= 1 
F(10,410) =  102.89425+ 
Test:  kl =  k2  = .  .  .  .  .  .  . =  klo 
F(9,410) =  8.4505921t 
a.  SWAM  Regression Model: MhTVAL =  Ue  +  k7NW +  e. 
t Significant at the 1% level. 
SOURCE: Author. 
1984  to a high of 82 cents on the dollar in the 
first quarter of 1986. In all quarters, k is positive 
and significantly different from one at the 1 per- 
cent level. As expected, there appears to be an 
inverse relationship between k and the level of 
interest rates. The general upward trend in 
k from the first quarter of 1984 to the second 
quarter of 1986 coincides with the downward 
trend in interest rates over this period. 
Table 3 presents the results of  joint 
tests of the SWAM coefficients and tests of pool- 
ing restrictions. A seemingly unrelated system of 
equations, with each quarter estimated as a 
separate regression, is used to perform the tests. 
We reject the joint restriction that  Ci, is zero in 
every equation at the 1 percent level, but we 
cannot reject the restriction that U, is equal 
across equations. For the slope coefficient, k, we 
reject both the cross-equation equality restriction 
and the joint restriction that k equals one in 
every quarter at the 1 percent level. Overall, the 
results of the joint tests and the pooling restric- 
tions support the forbearance hypothesis. 
Although the results of the SMVAM 
regressions are consistent with the forbearance 
hypothesis, the SWAM specification does not 
provide a direct test of the forbearance hypothe- 
sis. Recall that a thrift charter may have value 
exclusive of deposit insurance subsidies and for- 
bearances because the charter also contains the 
net value of all unbooked assets and liabilities. 
Moreover, estimates of  LJ,  could be positive and 
significant when the value of FSLIC forbearances 
and guarantees is zero. Estimated  U, could be 
insignificant (or negative and significant) when 
the value of FSLIC  forbearances and guarantees is 
positive and significant. 
TABLE  3 
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Results from the MSMVAM Regressionsa 
(Using GAAP Net worthb) 
Quarter  Ue  k 
1984  1  1395.67  0.40942t 
(0.193)'  (17.592) 
2  12627.61  0.42 1721 
(1.302)  (13.652) 
3  4231.84  0.46008t 
(0.388)  (11.881) 
4  - 5007.80  O.5301Ot 
(0.454)  (9.679) 
1985  1  -4171.15  0.62986t 
(-0.383)  (7.879) 
2  -8187.52  0.7066St 
(-  0.597)  (5.408) 
3  -8847.13  0.55141' 
(-0.645)  (9.093) 
4  - 23639.28  0.673?$ 
(-  1.265)  (5.129) 
1986  1  -30194.55  0.77275+ 
(-  1.464)  (3.332) 
a. Model: iMKTVAL =  U,  +  LTNW  +  PILIQ +  &DN +  P3TNWA + e.  t Significantly different from one at 1%. 
b.  Net worth computed using generally accepted accounting procedures.  tj- Significantly different from zero at 1%. 
c. T-statistics in parentheses.  * Significantly  different  from zero at 5%. 
** Significantly different from zero at  10% 
SOURCE: Author. 
- - 
TABLE  4 
A careful reexamination of the 
results in tables 1 and 2 indicates that the positive 
sign on U,  in every quarter is due, at least in part, 
to the positive value of FSUC guarantees and for- 
bearances. There is an inverse relationship 
between k and U,  /MKTVAL.  As the the market 
value of book equity increases, charter value as a 
percent of IMKTVAL decreases. The value of for- 
bearances and guarantees should be inversely 
related to k. 
On the other hand, the value of 
the charter exclusive of FSLIC  forbearances and 
guarantees is expected to be positively correlated 
with k.  This suggests that FSLIC forbearances and 
guarantees are a large enough portion of  U, that 
changes in their value dominate the pattern of 
I/, across quarters. 
To test the forbearance hypothesis 
more directly, we modify equation 1 to include 
the variables LIQ,  DN, and TNWA to proxy for 
FSLIC  forbearance policy: 
(2)  MKTVAL =  U, +  kTNW +  PlLIQ 
+  PZ  DN +  P3 TN WA +  e. 
The first forbearance proxy, LIQ, 
measures liquidity. Because the closing of an 
insolvent institution is an event timed by the reg- 
ulators, insolvency is a necessary, but not SUE- 
cient, condition for the forced closing of a thrift 
by its regulator. Given the growing insolvency of 
the FSLIC  insurance fund and the large number 
of  market-value and book-value insolvent thrifts 
(see Barth, et al. [I9851 and U.S. General 
Accounting Ofice [I9871  ),  the liquidity of the 
thrift affects the probability that FSLIC forbear- 
ances will be extended to stockholders. 
Insolvent thrifts (those that are not 
running up large losses) tend to be closed when 
illiquid, especially when they are insolvent 
according to market-value accounting, but not 
book-value accounting. Ceteris paribus, the more 
liquid the thrift, the less likely a liquidity crisis 
will cause the FHLBB to close the thrift. There- 
fore, the value of FSLIC forbearances should be 
positively related to liquidity. By construction, as 
LIQ  increases, the thrift's liquidity decreases. 
Consequently, PI should have a negative sign. 
The second forbearance proxy, DN, 
is a measure of diversification in the asset portfo- 
lio. DN includes both direct investments and 
nonmortgage loans and contracts. In March 1985, 
the FHLBB issued a formal regulation that restrict- 
ed direct investments to less than the minimum 
of 10 percent of total assets and twice the amount 
of capital. This regulation, which was in effect 
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Pooling and Cross-Equation Equality Restrictions 
for the MSMVAM Regressionsa 
Test:  -U,l  =O,U,z  =O, .......,  U,lo  = 0 
F(10,380) = 0.5559142 
Test:  U, 1  =  U,2  .  .  .  .  .  .  . =  U, 10 
F(9,380) = 0.61687062 
Test:  kl =  1,k2=  1, .......,  klo=  1 
F(10,380) =  90.82540t 
Test:  kl =  k2  = ....... =  k10 
F(9,380) =  6.800922Bt 
Test:  P1,l  =  0,Pl.z  = 0, .......  , Pl,lo  =  0 
F(10,380) = 0.98109793 
Test:  &,I  =  pl,~  =  .  .  .  .  .  .  . =  pl,lo 
3 2  F(9,380) = 0.82046518 
Test:  h,l = 0,  h,2 =  0, .  .  .  .  .  .  .  ,  =  0 
F(10,380) =  2.8303445* 
Test:  &,I  =  p2.2  = .  .  .  .  .  .  . =  p2,lo 
F(9,380) =  2.8692565* 
Test:  p3.1  =  0,(63,2  = 0, .......  , p3,10  =  0 
F(10,380) =  2.9404988* 
Test:  p3,1  =  /339  = .  .  .  .  .  .  . = p3.10 
F(9,380) = 0.98635699 
a. MSMVAM Regression Model: 
MKTVAL =  U, +  kTNW +  p1WQ  +  &DIV  +  &TNWA  +  e. 
j.  Significant at the 1%  level. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
SOURCE: Author. 
TABLE  5 
throughout the remainder of the sample period, 
applies only to nationally chartered thrifts, and 
not to the FSLIC-insured, state-chartered thrifts. 
The FHLBB is strongly opposed to 
direct investments by thrifts because it believes 
such investments increase the losses to the FSLIC 
fund when an insolvent thrift is closed (see Ben- 
ston [I9861  ).  Therefore, we expect there to be an 
inverse relationship between FSLIC forbearances 
and the level of direct investment. Given the 
FHLBB's policy regarding direct investment and 
its policy statements emphasizing mortgage lend- 
ing during this period, /32  should be negative in 
the sample period from March 1985 on.  Converse- 
ly, Dn/  could also be a proxy for management 
quality.9 That is, the market may view a decrease 
in the thrift's reliance on mortgages as an indica- 
tion of the quality of management. This diversifi- 
cation (management quality) explanation would 
make fi positive before March 1985. After that 
time, the sign of  /32  should be negative if the 
forbearance hypothesis holds. 
The third forbearance variable, 
TNWA proxies for solvency. Note that TNW is 
solvency measured by book, not market, values. 
This means that a thrift with positive TNWA could 
be insolvent on a market-value basis.I0 The value 
of deposit-guarantor forbearances depends on 
market solvency, not on TNWA On the other 
hand, the probability of forbearance is a function 
of  TNWA  FHLBB-mandated  capital requirements 
( TNW of 3% or more) are based on book 
values. FSLIC forbearances are extended to any 
institution that meets the minimum capital guide- 
lines, and they may be extended to institutions 
with deficient capital ratios. Therefore, we use 
TNWA as our proxy for solvency because the 
probability of forbearance is a positive function of 
TNWA The sign on /33  should be positive. 
The results from the regressions 
on equation 2 are reported in table 4. Joint tests 
of the regression coeficients and pooling tests 
for the small sample appear in table 5. For all 
quarters, the estimates of  U,  are not significantly 
different from zero in the modified SMVAM 
(MSMVAM)  regressions. In fact, we cannot reject 
the joint restriction that U, is zero in every quar- 
ter or the cross-equation equality restriction on 
U,. In the SMVAM  regressions, estimated U,  is 
significantly different from zero in five of the 10 
quarters, and we reject the joint restriction that 
UL,  is zero. 
However, k estimates are not 
affected by the inclusion of the forbearance prox- 
ies. Estimated k is positive and significantly less 
than one in every quarter, and we cannot reject 
the restriction that ~SMVAM =  ~MSMVAM in any 
quarter. Furthermore, both the joint test that 
k equals one in every quarter and the cross- 
equation equality restriction on k are rejected at 
the 1 percent level for both the SMVAM  and the 
.......................................... 
9 
In economics, we assume that management IS  a scarce resource. 
Therefore, f~rms  w~th  high-quality management w~ll  have a h~gher 
market value than f~rrns  w~th  lower-quality management. Th~s,  of  course, 
assumes that the market for  manager~al  talent  IS  not perfectly 
competltlve. 
10 
The  d~fference  between market-based and accounting-based 
measures of  solvency can be  qulte large. A  TNWA  of  3 per- 
cent is often used as a proxy for the  solvency threshold on a market- 
value bas~s. 
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MSMVAM  regressions. The difference (similarity) 
in the behavior of U, (k)  between the SWAM 
and the MSMVAM  regressions is consistent with 
the forbearance hypothesis. 
The coefficients on the forbearance 
proxies themselves present a mixed set of conclu- 
sions. The coefficient on LIQ,  PI,  is negative and 
significant in the second quarter of 1984, support- 
ing the forbearance hypothesis. However, PI  is 
not significantly different from zero in any other 
quarter, and we cannot reject the joint restriction 
that PI  equals zero in every quarter. Therefore, 
the overall performance of PI  does not provide 
strong support for the forbearance hypothesis." 
The poor performance by LIQ  may be due in 
large part to sample selection bias. The thrifts in 
this sample are the largest in the industry and are 
likely to have greater access to national capital 
markets, and therefore greater sources of liquid- 
ity, than the average thrift in the population. 
The results for the diversification 
(management quality) variable, DN, are also 
mixed. Pz  is positive and significant in the first 
two quarters of 1984 and negative and significant 
in the second quarter of 1986. Moreover, PZ  is 
positive in six of the 10 quarters in table 4. The 
cross-equation equality restriction on PZ  and the 
joint restriction that PZ  is zero in every equation 
are both rejected at the 5 percent level. 
On the surface, the seemingly con- 
flicting evidence provided by DIV seems to refute 
the forbearance hypothesis. But a closer inspec- 
tion of the results indicates that this is not the 
case. Recall that the FHLBB policy restricting 
direct investment did not go into effect until the 
first quarter of 1985. Therefore, the positive and 
significant (insignificant) P2's in the first 
(second) two quarters of 1984 are consistent with 
both the management-quality hypothesis and the 
forbearance hypothesis. 
Moreover, in table 4, pz  is positive 
but not significant twice, and negative and signif- 
icant once, after the FHLBB took a stand against 
direct investment and against diversification of 
the asset portfolio away from mortgage-based 
assets. In fact, if  we split the sample according to 
this policy change, we cannot reject the cross- 
equation equality restriction on pz  in the pre- 
and post-policy change periods. However, in the 
first period we reject the joint restriction that 
Ij2  equals zero at the 1 percent level, but we 
cannot reject it in the second period. 
The poor performance of  the Ilquldity proxy was not due  to  1  1  proxy varnble conslructlon Smllar results were obta~ned 
with other spec~ficatlons  of 110 
I 
Although TNWA  1s  TNW  scaled by total book assets, there  1  2  IS almost no correlation between  TNWA  and  TNW  lor any 
of  the quarters In either sample 
Of all of the forbearance proxies, 
TNW4 the solvency proxy, provides the strongest 
evidence supporting the forbearance hypothesi~.~~ 
P3  is positive in every quarter and is significant in 
six quarters. The significance of 63  in every quar- 
ter from the last quarter of 1984 through the first 
quarter of 1986 coincides with the time period 
when the FSLIC fund was shrinking as a result of 
massive losses in the thrift industry (see U.S. 
General Accounting Office  [ 19871 and Barth, et 
al. [I9851  ). The joint restriction that  equals 
zero in every equation is rejected at the 5 percent 
level. However, we cannot reject the cross- 
equation equality restriction on &. 
Even though the results were 
somewhat disappointing when we look at the 
forbearance proxies individually, the overall 
results are encouraging. Looking at table 4, we 
see that in every quarter except the third quarter 
of  1984, U, is not significantly different from 
zero, and at least one of the forbearance proxies 
is significantly different from zero and correctly 
signed. Moreover, we obtain these results using a 
sample that is likely to be biased against support- 
ing our maintained hypothesis. That is, our sam- 
ple is drawn from the largest firms in the indus- 
try, and it is likely that we undersample the part 
of the industry for whom the FSLIC forbearance 
policy has the most value. 
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Deposit-insurance guarantees and forbearances 
have value. The value of FSUC deposit guarantees 
and forbearances is reflected in the market value 
of thrift institution stocks. Proxies for FSLIC for- 
bearances and forbearance policy are shown to 
be related to thrift charter values. The empirical 
results of this paper support Kane's (1986) argu- 
ment that FSLIC forbearances and guarantees are 
an increasingly important source of thrift charter 
value. Our results also support Thomson's (1987) 
theoretical result that the extension of forbear- 
ances to stockholders of insolvent institutions 
increases the value of stockholders' equity. 
Because deposit-insurance forbear- 
ances to stockholders increase the value of the 
stockholders' position in the firm at the expense 
of the federal deposit guarantor, and ultimately the 
federal taxpayer, the federal deposit-insurance 
agencies should always close out the position of 
the stockholders when reorganizing insolvent insti- 
tutions. Capital forbearance programs, such as 
those utilized by the FHLBB  in dealing with thrift 
insolvencies and those being used by bank regula- 
tors for agricultural and energy lenders, result in a 
bailout of deposit institutions' stockholders by the 
federal taxpayer. Our results support the concept 
of the management consignment program current- 
ly  used by the FHLBB to reduce the unintended 
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value of deposit-insurance subsidies. However, 
our results also indicate that the FDIC should re- 
think its capital forbearance and open-bank assis- 
tance policies, unless the bailouts of existing man- 
agements and shareholders of failed and failing 
banks are the intended results of those policies. 
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